I am broadly interested in the diversity in state-level politics regarding punishment, incarceration, and criminal justice.
My dissertation considers the adoption of private prisons in the last three decades, one of the most peculiar developments in the American carceral state over that time period. I examine the use of this policy and finds that none of the typical explanations - politics, economics, unionization, and others - explain why states privatize their prisons. I argue it is mounting pressure from inmate litigation that prompts this policy choice, whereas a higher number of successful court orders that mandate procedural change make it less likely for the state to privatize. This claim is bolstered empirically by an instrumental variables analysis and an original dataset on private prisons, and further supported by evidence that private prison firms themselves react negatively to announcements of court orders. This dissertation has implications for the study of the carceral state specifically and broadly on the lessons of the rights revolution: what are the unintended, perhaps negative consequences of providing more representation to underprivileged groups?
Here is a list of my working paper projects, some more nascent than others.
"Why Do States Privatize their Prisons? The Unintended Consequences of Inmate Litigation." (Job market paper).
The United States has witnessed privatization of a variety of government functions over the last three decades. Media and politicians often attribute the decision to privatize to ideological commitments to small government and fiscal pressure. These claims are particularly notable in the context of prison privatization, where states and the federal government have employed private companies to operate and manage private correctional facilities. I argue state prison privatization is not a function of simple ideological or economic considerations. Rather, prison privatization has been a (potentially unintended) consequence of the administrative and legal costs associated with litigation brought by prisoners. I assemble an original database of prison privatization in the US and demonstrate that the privatization of prisons is best predicted by the legal pressure on state corrections systems, rather than the ideological orientation of a state government. PDF of most recent version here, comments welcome. Appendix here.
"Partisan Politics, Social Control, and Corrections Spending: The Counterbalancing Effect of Black Political Incorporation." Theories concerning the adoption of punitive policies at the state level often cite two dynamics: conservative ideology and racial threat, that punitive policies are more likely in states with Republican politicians and a higher proportion of Black residents. I argue these theories lose their explanatory power in the post-Civil Rights era, and suggest Black political incorporation acts as a powerful antidote to the punitive impulses of government officials. I test my hypotheses on a dataset of state corrections spending from 1983 to 2011 and find evidence for the counterbalancing argument. States with increasing percentages of Black state legislators spend 0.42 fewer dollars per capita on corrections, suggesting Black political incorporation is an important mediator in the relationship between racial threat and corrections budgets. This paper has implications for the application of the social control theory as descriptive representation grows, but also for the study of the effect of minority politicians on budgets and policy more broadly. The adoption of policies deleterious to certain communities can be mitigated by the presence of representatives who legislate on behalf of those communities.
"Who Punishes More? Partisanship, Punitive Policies, and the Puzzle of Democratic Governors." The growth of the carceral state over the last few decades has been remarkable, with millions of Americans in prison, jail, on parole or probation. However, political science explanations of this policy largely identify partisanship as a key explanatory variable in the adoption of punitive policies: by this theory, Republicans are the driving force behind these measures. This paper argues this explanation is incomplete and emphasizes the bipartisan coalition that built the carceral state. I argue Democratic governors will be incentivized to pursue more punitive policies to compete with Republicans, especially when they are electorally vulnerable. I test this proposition using a series of regression discontinuity designs and find causal evidence for Democrats' complicity in the expansion of the carceral state. Democratic governors who barely win outincarcerate and outspend their Republican counterparts on corrections, highlighting their role as key architects in the creation of the vast criminal justice system and its punitive institutions.
"Does Military Aid to Police Decrease Crime? Counterevidence from the Federal 1033 Program and Local Police Jurisdictions in the United States." With Tom Clark, Adam Glynn, Michael Leo Owens, Elisha Cohen, and Kaylyn Jackson. For three decades, the federal government has been supplying local law enforcement agencies with surplus military equipment, on the logic the support will enhance crime fighting and law enforcement. This policy has helped change the physical profile of policing, "militarizing" it. But the question remains, does the policy serve the stated goal of reducing crime rates? Scholars debate that question. We join the debate, demonstrating deep problems with commonly used data about the collection and retention of SME by local law enforcement agencies. We also revisit two prominent "police militarization" studies, using new data to demonstrate that any conclusions that military aid reduces crime are likely driven by flawed data. Data quality problems with SME records seriously limit the ability to assess the effects of police militarization on law enforcement and public safety.
"Ban the Box Adoptions by Cities and States." With Michael Leo Owens.
My dissertation considers the adoption of private prisons in the last three decades, one of the most peculiar developments in the American carceral state over that time period. I examine the use of this policy and finds that none of the typical explanations - politics, economics, unionization, and others - explain why states privatize their prisons. I argue it is mounting pressure from inmate litigation that prompts this policy choice, whereas a higher number of successful court orders that mandate procedural change make it less likely for the state to privatize. This claim is bolstered empirically by an instrumental variables analysis and an original dataset on private prisons, and further supported by evidence that private prison firms themselves react negatively to announcements of court orders. This dissertation has implications for the study of the carceral state specifically and broadly on the lessons of the rights revolution: what are the unintended, perhaps negative consequences of providing more representation to underprivileged groups?
Here is a list of my working paper projects, some more nascent than others.
"Why Do States Privatize their Prisons? The Unintended Consequences of Inmate Litigation." (Job market paper).
The United States has witnessed privatization of a variety of government functions over the last three decades. Media and politicians often attribute the decision to privatize to ideological commitments to small government and fiscal pressure. These claims are particularly notable in the context of prison privatization, where states and the federal government have employed private companies to operate and manage private correctional facilities. I argue state prison privatization is not a function of simple ideological or economic considerations. Rather, prison privatization has been a (potentially unintended) consequence of the administrative and legal costs associated with litigation brought by prisoners. I assemble an original database of prison privatization in the US and demonstrate that the privatization of prisons is best predicted by the legal pressure on state corrections systems, rather than the ideological orientation of a state government. PDF of most recent version here, comments welcome. Appendix here.
"Partisan Politics, Social Control, and Corrections Spending: The Counterbalancing Effect of Black Political Incorporation." Theories concerning the adoption of punitive policies at the state level often cite two dynamics: conservative ideology and racial threat, that punitive policies are more likely in states with Republican politicians and a higher proportion of Black residents. I argue these theories lose their explanatory power in the post-Civil Rights era, and suggest Black political incorporation acts as a powerful antidote to the punitive impulses of government officials. I test my hypotheses on a dataset of state corrections spending from 1983 to 2011 and find evidence for the counterbalancing argument. States with increasing percentages of Black state legislators spend 0.42 fewer dollars per capita on corrections, suggesting Black political incorporation is an important mediator in the relationship between racial threat and corrections budgets. This paper has implications for the application of the social control theory as descriptive representation grows, but also for the study of the effect of minority politicians on budgets and policy more broadly. The adoption of policies deleterious to certain communities can be mitigated by the presence of representatives who legislate on behalf of those communities.
"Who Punishes More? Partisanship, Punitive Policies, and the Puzzle of Democratic Governors." The growth of the carceral state over the last few decades has been remarkable, with millions of Americans in prison, jail, on parole or probation. However, political science explanations of this policy largely identify partisanship as a key explanatory variable in the adoption of punitive policies: by this theory, Republicans are the driving force behind these measures. This paper argues this explanation is incomplete and emphasizes the bipartisan coalition that built the carceral state. I argue Democratic governors will be incentivized to pursue more punitive policies to compete with Republicans, especially when they are electorally vulnerable. I test this proposition using a series of regression discontinuity designs and find causal evidence for Democrats' complicity in the expansion of the carceral state. Democratic governors who barely win outincarcerate and outspend their Republican counterparts on corrections, highlighting their role as key architects in the creation of the vast criminal justice system and its punitive institutions.
"Does Military Aid to Police Decrease Crime? Counterevidence from the Federal 1033 Program and Local Police Jurisdictions in the United States." With Tom Clark, Adam Glynn, Michael Leo Owens, Elisha Cohen, and Kaylyn Jackson. For three decades, the federal government has been supplying local law enforcement agencies with surplus military equipment, on the logic the support will enhance crime fighting and law enforcement. This policy has helped change the physical profile of policing, "militarizing" it. But the question remains, does the policy serve the stated goal of reducing crime rates? Scholars debate that question. We join the debate, demonstrating deep problems with commonly used data about the collection and retention of SME by local law enforcement agencies. We also revisit two prominent "police militarization" studies, using new data to demonstrate that any conclusions that military aid reduces crime are likely driven by flawed data. Data quality problems with SME records seriously limit the ability to assess the effects of police militarization on law enforcement and public safety.
"Ban the Box Adoptions by Cities and States." With Michael Leo Owens.