I am broadly interested in the diversity in state-level politics regarding punishment, incarceration, and criminal justice.
My dissertation considers the adoption of private prisons in the last three decades, one of the most peculiar developments in the American carceral state over that time period. I examine the use of this policy and finds that none of the typical explanations - politics, economics, unionization, and others - explain why states privatize their prisons. I argue it is mounting pressure from inmate litigation that prompts this policy choice, whereas a higher number of successful court orders that mandate procedural change make it less likely for the state to privatize. This claim is bolstered empirically by an instrumental variables analysis and an original dataset on private prisons, and further supported by evidence that private prison firms themselves react negatively to announcements of court orders. This dissertation has implications for the study of the carceral state specifically and broadly on the lessons of the rights revolution: what are the unintended, perhaps negative consequences of providing more representation to underprivileged groups?
Here is a list of my working paper projects, some more nascent than others.
"Why Do States Privatize their Prisons? The Unintended Consequences of Inmate Litigation." (Job market paper).
The United States has witnessed privatization of a variety of government functions over the last three decades. Media and politicians often attribute the decision to privatize to ideological commitments to small government and fiscal pressure. These claims are particularly notable in the context of prison privatization, where states and the federal government have employed private companies to operate and manage private correctional facilities. I argue state prison privatization is not a function of simple ideological or economic considerations. Rather, prison privatization has been a (potentially unintended) consequence of the administrative and legal costs associated with litigation brought by prisoners. I assemble an original database of prison privatization in the US and demonstrate that the privatization of prisons is best predicted by the legal pressure on state corrections systems, rather than the ideological orientation of a state government. PDF of most recent version here, comments welcome. Appendix here.
"Do Private Prison Companies Suffer When Inmates Win Lawsuits?" The central claim of my dissertation argues it is the advent of inmates' rights and rising prisoner litigation that contributed to the rise of prison privatization in the state. A separate dissertation chapter considers this relationship from the viewpoint of the business: is it the case that the economic future of the company is vulnerable to the announcement of successful court orders? I use event study methodology and find I find that on aggregate, investors are not particularly concerned with these judicial decrees. Rather, investors respond to the lawsuits in those states that are the most consequential for private prison firms' business. This chapter fleshes out the behavior of private prison companies and provides further empirical evidence for the central claim of the dissertation, that private prison firms are indeed vulnerable to the announcement of court orders.
"The Political and Economic Determinants of the American States' Reliance on Private Prisons." Privatization of government industries began in full swing in the 1980s and touched dozens of policymaking areas, including corrections. In the last three decades, the share of the prison population under the control of private companies has increased from zero to nearly 9% today. This paper aims to explore the determinants of this particular policy choice by extending previous theories of prison privatization and arguing this process is a two-stage one in which states first decide whether to adopt private prisons at all, then determine the level of privatization in their corrections systems. The role of unions in slowing the growth of privatization is reaffirmed, while the effect of politics is contra to the one suggested by the literature. The results here prompt a reevaluation of the factors that lead a state to privatize, call into question a monolithic theory of privatization, and recommend a new theory be constructed of the privatization of force.
"The Politics of Budgetary Institutions and Corrections Spending in the American States, 1983-2011." Over the last three decades, massive growth in incarceration spurred the rapid expansion of state corrections budgets, increasing those budgets by nearly $40 billion. This paper explores the determinants of corrections budgets and its two components, institutions, which include prisons, and community supervision, which encompasses parole and probation. I analyze how gubernatorial partisanship and budgetary institutions independently and conditionally affect state corrections expenditures. To do this, I utilize an original dataset of corrections spending in the states from 1983 to 2011 and conduct both a difference-in-differences and difference-in-differences analysis, finding legislative partisanship and budgetary institutions mediate the effect of partisanship on corrections spending. Gubernatorial budget power only bites when governors are dealing with co-partisans, suggesting governors only wield this power in particular institutional environments.
"Who Pays More For Corrections? Partisanship and the Puzzle of Democratic Governors." In the last three decades, the American carceral state has grown at an unprecedented rate. This growth, fueled by a massive rise in incarceration and community corrections like parole and probation, occurred precisely because politicians allocated the funds in order to construct prisons and strengthen reentry programs. This paper analyzes state corrections spending and poses a simple question: how does gubernatorial partisanship influence the level of corrections expenditures in a particular state? I utilize a causal design and find Democratic governors, not Republican ones, are associated with higher corrections spending, a result that remains robust across different categories of spending and in different geographies. These findings suggest the expansion of the carceral state, at least among the states, was a bipartisan effort.
"Ban the Box Adoptions by Cities and States." With Michael Leo Owens.
"Police Violence and Democracy." Multi-paper project, with Tom Clark, Adam Glynn, and Michael Leo Owens.
My dissertation considers the adoption of private prisons in the last three decades, one of the most peculiar developments in the American carceral state over that time period. I examine the use of this policy and finds that none of the typical explanations - politics, economics, unionization, and others - explain why states privatize their prisons. I argue it is mounting pressure from inmate litigation that prompts this policy choice, whereas a higher number of successful court orders that mandate procedural change make it less likely for the state to privatize. This claim is bolstered empirically by an instrumental variables analysis and an original dataset on private prisons, and further supported by evidence that private prison firms themselves react negatively to announcements of court orders. This dissertation has implications for the study of the carceral state specifically and broadly on the lessons of the rights revolution: what are the unintended, perhaps negative consequences of providing more representation to underprivileged groups?
Here is a list of my working paper projects, some more nascent than others.
"Why Do States Privatize their Prisons? The Unintended Consequences of Inmate Litigation." (Job market paper).
The United States has witnessed privatization of a variety of government functions over the last three decades. Media and politicians often attribute the decision to privatize to ideological commitments to small government and fiscal pressure. These claims are particularly notable in the context of prison privatization, where states and the federal government have employed private companies to operate and manage private correctional facilities. I argue state prison privatization is not a function of simple ideological or economic considerations. Rather, prison privatization has been a (potentially unintended) consequence of the administrative and legal costs associated with litigation brought by prisoners. I assemble an original database of prison privatization in the US and demonstrate that the privatization of prisons is best predicted by the legal pressure on state corrections systems, rather than the ideological orientation of a state government. PDF of most recent version here, comments welcome. Appendix here.
"Do Private Prison Companies Suffer When Inmates Win Lawsuits?" The central claim of my dissertation argues it is the advent of inmates' rights and rising prisoner litigation that contributed to the rise of prison privatization in the state. A separate dissertation chapter considers this relationship from the viewpoint of the business: is it the case that the economic future of the company is vulnerable to the announcement of successful court orders? I use event study methodology and find I find that on aggregate, investors are not particularly concerned with these judicial decrees. Rather, investors respond to the lawsuits in those states that are the most consequential for private prison firms' business. This chapter fleshes out the behavior of private prison companies and provides further empirical evidence for the central claim of the dissertation, that private prison firms are indeed vulnerable to the announcement of court orders.
"The Political and Economic Determinants of the American States' Reliance on Private Prisons." Privatization of government industries began in full swing in the 1980s and touched dozens of policymaking areas, including corrections. In the last three decades, the share of the prison population under the control of private companies has increased from zero to nearly 9% today. This paper aims to explore the determinants of this particular policy choice by extending previous theories of prison privatization and arguing this process is a two-stage one in which states first decide whether to adopt private prisons at all, then determine the level of privatization in their corrections systems. The role of unions in slowing the growth of privatization is reaffirmed, while the effect of politics is contra to the one suggested by the literature. The results here prompt a reevaluation of the factors that lead a state to privatize, call into question a monolithic theory of privatization, and recommend a new theory be constructed of the privatization of force.
"The Politics of Budgetary Institutions and Corrections Spending in the American States, 1983-2011." Over the last three decades, massive growth in incarceration spurred the rapid expansion of state corrections budgets, increasing those budgets by nearly $40 billion. This paper explores the determinants of corrections budgets and its two components, institutions, which include prisons, and community supervision, which encompasses parole and probation. I analyze how gubernatorial partisanship and budgetary institutions independently and conditionally affect state corrections expenditures. To do this, I utilize an original dataset of corrections spending in the states from 1983 to 2011 and conduct both a difference-in-differences and difference-in-differences analysis, finding legislative partisanship and budgetary institutions mediate the effect of partisanship on corrections spending. Gubernatorial budget power only bites when governors are dealing with co-partisans, suggesting governors only wield this power in particular institutional environments.
"Who Pays More For Corrections? Partisanship and the Puzzle of Democratic Governors." In the last three decades, the American carceral state has grown at an unprecedented rate. This growth, fueled by a massive rise in incarceration and community corrections like parole and probation, occurred precisely because politicians allocated the funds in order to construct prisons and strengthen reentry programs. This paper analyzes state corrections spending and poses a simple question: how does gubernatorial partisanship influence the level of corrections expenditures in a particular state? I utilize a causal design and find Democratic governors, not Republican ones, are associated with higher corrections spending, a result that remains robust across different categories of spending and in different geographies. These findings suggest the expansion of the carceral state, at least among the states, was a bipartisan effort.
"Ban the Box Adoptions by Cities and States." With Michael Leo Owens.
"Police Violence and Democracy." Multi-paper project, with Tom Clark, Adam Glynn, and Michael Leo Owens.